The ever-Rising Bar
for having a 'Credible Threat'

A pro-Deterrence Argument:
We need a 'credible' Deterrence

The argument for needing a 'credible' deterrence is that our weapon system for making a retaliatory nuclear attack needs to be sufficiently threatening to other NW nations, and especially to our strongest nuclear weapon adversaries. That is, the nuclear threat we pose to other NW nations has to be credibly convincing.

This thinking is based on a fear that another NW nation might attack our nation, if we did not have a credible nuclear deterrence – a 'sufficient' or 'credible' nuclear threat to other NW nations – so that they will not dare to attack our nation because of our capable power of nuclear retaliation.

The Implication of 'credible'

The implication, which then follows from this thinking, is that our deterrence system has to have enough threatening weapons and sufficiently advanced weapons, in order to be a 'credible threat' to the other NW nations.

Consequently, as follows from this need for having a credible deterrence, is a continually rising bar for having a 'credible threat' – which means, an continually increasing need for evermore advanced weapons – to keep up with (or even surpass) the weapon advances of other NW nations.

In other words, an inherent implication of the Deterrence Policy, with its “need” for having a 'credible deterrence', is a never-ending weapons race between NW nations, because they will have to continually 'keep up' with the new advances of other NW nations. And the added problem in this is that weapon technology can always be advancing, if a nation puts money and effort into R&D for advancing their weapon technologies – so nations could always and continually be advancing their weapons, since our human abilities to discover new advanced technologies seems to be potentially endless.

Therefore, inherent in the nuclear deterrence thinking and policy is the problematic implication of a global race for more and more advanced weapons and delivery systems, as each NW nation reacts to the new threats from other NW nations advancing their weapons in order to keep pace with the others, and so it goes, an endless global escalation of ever-advanced weapons – in order to keep up with the ever-rising bar for having a 'credible deterrence'.

So, as each competing NW nation keeps improving their nuclear weapon systems, other NW nations will in reaction follow suit, as the 'bar keeps rising' for credible deterrence in this never-ending and escalating hi-tech weapons race.

Even the “need” itself, based on a belief or information that an adversary is developing superior advanced weapons, could be based on just a suspicion or possibility. For if there is even a suspicion of an advesarial NW nation seeking to improve their weapons, then this will be used as a justification for that nation's “need” to keep investing in the research and production of better and more advanced weapons.

In summary, when any one of the weaponized nations makes new advances in their weapon systems, or even if there is a suspicion that they might do this, then any adversarial NW nations will think they also need to increase or advance their own weapon systems, in order to compete and 'credibly' deter their adversary's newly advanced weaponry.

The Deterrence Argument of 'What if?'

The bar for having a 'credible' deterrence
is extra inflated by the worry of 'What if?'. The worry and its logic goes like this.

What if... an adversary is secretly working on new hi-tech advanced weapons and delivery systems that could penetrate and overpower our national defense?

What if... an adversary uses an undetectable or super-advanced weapon in a surprise attack?

We need to be ready for this!

Therefore, we need to spend hundreds of billions of dollars each year for researching and developing more advanced nuclear weapon systems.

An Exaggerated Risk

Being nuclear attacked by another nation
is extremely improbable

The fear (or concern) of being attacked with nuclear weapons is extremely improbable, and thus it is an irrational, exaggerated fear. The probability of being attacked with nuclear weapons is even less probable if nations simply agreed to weaken or eliminate those weapons.

It can be admitted that a nation might have reasonable concern if some other nations (viewed as threatening adversaries) have definite superior capacities to launch an attack. However, both reason and history show that this concern has little weight.

First, the probability of a stronger national military attacking a weaker militarized nation is extremely rare and its supposed benefits are outweighed by its economic and human costs.

Throughout history there has always been some large disparities between different national military capacities; yet very rarely does a stronger nation attack a weaker nation just because it could likely win. And what would be gained? The costs and problems incurred from an attack, along with the multiple problems consequently incurred in attempting to make that nation conform to the attackers intentions, will far outweigh any hoped for benefits.

Second, in all of the history of nuclear weapons, no nuclear weaponized nation has ever launched nuclear weapons on a nation that did not have these weapons, except for their use against Japan to end WWII.

Third, if there is a concern about some other nation(s) possibly launching a military nuclear attack, the solution to this concern does not have to involve a competitive escalation of one's own military capacity so that it equals or exceeds other nation's military capacities.

Solving a concern for national security, in a global situation in which one is out-weaponed by some other nation(s), does not have to be solved by maximizing one's own arsenal of weapons. Instead, it is far less expensive and even more secure in the long-run to increase peaceful diplomacy, make mutually beneficial economic agreements, and mitigate any possible reasons for other nations to attack.

The Real Concern of Large Nations,
such as Russia and China,
is Economic – not Military Conquer !

See –
→ Our Delusion of Cold War Thinking
→ Better Alternatives for Defense

Dangerous Consequences of continually developing more Advanced Weapons

Maintaining a robust Deterrence
could provoke a first-strike attack

Maintaining a robust Deterrence, with superior capabilities, could motivate a first-strike from a nuclear adversary.

If a NW nation believes that an adversary's nuclear weapon systems are far superior to their own and could overwhelmingly defeat their current defense, then that weaker nation might fearfully react with a surprise first attack on the stronger nation, rather than wait and worry about being defeated by the stronger nation.

In other words, if a nation thinks that an adversarial NW nation has a far superior weapon capability, even if they say it is only for defense, then the weaker nation might launch a surprise first-strike attack before that stronger nation has a chance to launch their superior weapons.

Thus, by developing super advanced and superior weapons, that nation could end up provoking a first-strike by an adversary who thinks their defense is now in jeopardy if that superior-weapon nation were to attack with their overwhelming weapons.

A never-ending 'Need'
and an endless Competition
for more-advanced Weapons

Based on the Deterrence thinking and assumptions, each nation with a deterrence strategy must continually improve their weapon systems and produce evermore advanced weapons.

This creates an endless “need” for 'improved weapons'. It's endless because there will always be technological improvements, so when any nation has a policy or strategy to always attempt to technologically advance their weaponry. Then, other nations will be threatened by this and therefore try to keep up with their own technological advances, and so it goes, an endless circular self-perpetuating cause-effect global escalation of continually improving these nuclear weapon threats, as each competing nation attempts to surpass or at least to keep pace with the zeal for evermore advanced hi-tech weaponry.

All of this creates a self-perpetuating system that is never-ending – until it is finally seen as irrationally ridiculous. And all of this ends up being a complete waste of money. None of this hi-tech advanced weaponry will ever be used, or worse, it will be used and destroy many people and much of the global ecosystem.

Consequently, as nuclear weapons become more advanced, the whole world is less-safe and more threatened with mass destruction.

And throughout this insane competition, nations keep wasting billions on improving their nuclear weapon capabilities.

A Continuous Need for Weapons R&D

Each year we pour billions of taxdollars into 'Research & Development' of newer advanced delivery systems intended for nuclear retaliation. This large yearly budget for R&D is "necessary", according to pro-Deterrence advisors, because we need to keep pace with the possible R&D advancements of our nuclear adversaries, such as Russia and China; and since the results of these R&D investments requires many years of research, deterrence proponents argue that a continuous yearly investment in Weapons R&D is "necessary" for our long-term national security.

The reasoning here is that, the more money and effort we put into Weapons R&D right now, the more advanced weapons we will have in the future. And if we do not, then in just a few years our nuclear advesaries might have more advanced and superior weapons than ours, and thus those other NW nations would be a worse threat to our national security. So the worry here is that our adversaries might get a head start on their Weapons R&D, and thus surpass us later on in weapon advancements. Therefore, they argue, we cannot lag on Weapons R&D investments.

In summary, pro-deterrence advocates claim there is a national security 'need' to spend vast amounts of public money on Weapons R&D, so that we match up to or exceed our adversary's possible advancements in weapons – as the bar keeps rising for what is a 'credible' nuclear defense – requiring newer and newer advanced weapons – not just to keep pace with the kinds of weapons now in the world, but also to keep pace with the 'possibilities' of newer and better advanced weapons developed by other nations. Though also, of course, we have to keep spending billions each year into maintaining and fixing the weapon systems we already have.

The circular cause-effect
and self-escalating problem

The problematic implication of this reasoning is that our nuclear retaliatory-attack weaponry needs to be continually updated and improved, in order for our nuclear weapons to be a 'credible deterrent'.

Yet, this kind of thinking and policy creates its own self-perpetuating problematic implication.

That is, the need to maintain a 'credible threat' [to other nations] creates its own self-perpetuating and self-escalating consequences. For it will frighten the others to become equally as threatening, which then increases everyone to be even more threatening, and so it goes, creating an endless and increasing escalation of nuclear weapons.

So, when a NW nation increases or advances their nuclear weapons, the other nations become more worried and threatened, which then motivates them to increase and advance their nuclear weapons.

In other words, when a NW nation increases or advances their weapons, in order to keep up with other nations increasing or advancing their nuclear weapons, then this 'adjustment' sets off a new need for other nations to increase or advance their weapons even more!

And so it goes: a perpetual never-ending global escalation, as the bar [for being a 'credible threat'] keeps raising.

An added problem is that the more threatening a nation becomes, in order to be a 'credible threat' to other NW nations, the more likely that a competing NW nation might launch a surprise attack because of being overly worried about being first attacked by that nation having such a strong 'credible threat'.

A never-ending Spending
for Weapon Advancements

The deterrence argument for continually spending money on improving weapons is:

Since other NW nations might keep improving their nuclear weapons and delivery systems, (in order to continually improve their 'deterrence threat' or else to improve their first strike capacity), our nation “must” keep spending more and more money to produce increasingly advanced nuclear weapons.

The problematic implication of this kind of thinking, which is inherent in the Deterrence Model of Security, is a continuous and endless Spending on Deterrence Weapons and Delivery Systems.

That is, inherent in the Deterrence Policy is a never-ending enormous Cost to keep improving and advancing weapons for nuclear deterrence – as the rhetoric of 'credible deterrence' keeps on justifying a massive yearly budget for improving weapon systems, with huge billion dollar contracts to weapon manufacturers – in order to credibly compete with our potential adversaries.

And it just so happens that this Deterrence Thinking results in continual yearly massive profits for the weapon industry and its investors. So the weapons industry continues to acquire huge billion dollar profits each year, due to this nuclear deterrence policy. Is that just a coincidence in the continual perpetuation of this policy?

Moreover, let us remember that many of the top pentagon advisors and defense department officials have 'previous' connections with the weapons industry, or in many cases, they are currently employed and/or financially inversted in those industries.

Thus, companies producing nuclear weapons or advanced hi-tech parts are hugely profiting each year by the 'keeping up with the Jones' Deterrence Policy. And who is paying for all this Cost? Mostly middle income taxpayers.

Instead, it would be much less costly, and also produce a safer world, if nations eliminated nuclear weapons, or at least greatly reduced them. So instead of this never-ending Cost for producing better and better nuclear weapons, as a result of the deterrence policy, NW nations could internationally negotiate massive reductions in their arsenals and make practical agreements to not keep spending money on the research and development of ever-advanced weapon systems, which would benefit all the nations so that they can instead use this capital and resources for social and clean environment projects.

In other words,
Spend Money on People & the Environment,
rather than on mass-destructive weapons
(which can never be used without a massive humanitarian and environmental tragedy)

Or if some degree of nuclear deterrence is still thought to be needed, then at least, minimally, reduce all these weapons – because all nuclear nations could just as well have only a dozen nuclear weapons, not hundreds or thousands. For it only takes one successful nuclear strike to destroy plenty of people and also contribute to destroying the Earth's ecosystem. Isn't that enough of a credible threat?

Massive Expenditures

One of the main negative implications of the Deterrence Policy is its Extreme Expense
– its Huge Cost.

Nuclear Deterrence has resulted in enormous expenditures in producing nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, along with continually maintaining and improving them.

An estimated $100 billion is spent globally each year on nuclear weapons and delivery systems; even though this money could instead be used to help solve problems of climate change, pollution, famine, hunger, disease, and economic poverty.

Especially in the U.S., this defense policy of 'Deterrence' is used as a justification for massive military spending and lucrative billion dollar contracts to Defense/Weapons Companies.

The US Congressional Budget Office estimates that about $50 billion a year will be spent over the next 10 years....
see their Report

During the Bush, Obama, Trump, and now Biden administration, there is no significant difference in our US Policy and Massive Expense on Nuclear Weapons and their delivery systems. In fact, those costs keep rising, as pro-weapon “advisors” (from the weapons industry btw) are continually provoking a fear that China and Russia will out-pace us in advanced weapon systems, UNLESS we spend more and more billions each year on improving our weapons, as a New Nuclear Arms Race [for Super Hi-tech weapons] is now unfolding..

Also, many of our offensive retaliatory weapons are reaching the end of their service life. Those forces consist of submarines that launch ballistic missiles (SSBNs), land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long-range bomber aircraft, shorter-range tactical aircraft carrying bombs, and the nuclear warheads that those delivery systems carry. Over the next two decades, essentially all of those components of nuclear forces will have to be refurbished or replaced with new systems if the United States is to continue fielding those capabilities.

The glamor of super-advanced Weapons

Is this just a glamour of military leaders and advisors for creating ever advanced Weapons?

Perhaps military leaders and advisors are actually fascinated and amazed by having newer and newer hi-tech advanced weapons, much like a child's attraction to sci-fi weapons.

But, these weapons are real not fantasy, and they can kill many people and destroy local environments.

Or, is this a hi-tech vision promoted by weapons developers? – Promoted by those who receive the millions and billions of government contracts. For they are the special interest group most benefiting from this whole Deterrence thinking and policy, which just happens to be in a perpetual need for more and better weapons. Our Deterrence Policy looks like it was written just for the weapons mafia, then accepted by government as policy.

Who really benefits from this policy of always needing to improve and modernize weapons? It primarily serves the financial ambitions of a coalition of weapons ('defense') contractors and associates, not national security nor world peace.

So perhaps 'defense' is not even the real reason for continual advancement of nuclear weapon systems. Perhaps the real reason is for the Weapons Industry to make billions in profits from a never-ending “need” for greater and greater advanced weapons. Do our representatives make these policy, or do lobbyists for the weapon industry make this policy? Hey, who's in charge here?

A pro-Deterrence argument:

Russia or China might be developing
new advanced weapon systems,
so we have to keep up with them

Counter-arguments:

The simplistic pro-argument of
'they-might so we-must'

One of the ongoing arguments by pro-Deterrence advocates is a concern that Russia and/or China might develop new advanced weapons that are better than ours (the U.S.).

Therefore, we must continuously develop new advanced weapons, in order to to maintain our weapon superiority, or at least keep pace with their possible advancements.

In other words, if we think they might be developing improved weapons, then we too must develop improved weapons, so that our nuclear threat is greater or equal to theirs.
Such is the 'What if?' argument.

The problematic implication
of a continuous weapons race

When we think about this logically – this kind of policy-making assumption, or worry, will result in a perpetual, continual, and never ending competition to have more better weapons.

Thus, inherent in the Nuclear Deterrence reasoning is the problematic implication of an endless self-perpetuating competition for more advanced weapons.

Even just a suspicion that Russia or China might develop more advanced weapons is considered to be a sufficient justification for our nation to develop more advanced weapons, and the huge expense involved with the research and production of these new weapon systems.

Thus, to maintain national security, we need to continually develop more advanced weapons, because our adversaries might be developing more advanced weapons. Though as we work on developing more advanced weapons, our nuclear adversaries will then 'need to' keep up with our new advances. And so it goes, an endless weapons race.

And because adversarial nuclear weapon nations will be thinking in the same manner, the result is an endless global competition for more advanced weapons.

In addition, all nations involved in this 'competition for better weapons' end up spending a large portion of their national budget on improving their military and weapons defense. In the U.S., this happens to enrich the weapons industry and their major investors – though they are enriched with taxpayer dollars.

This Weapon-threatening relationship
is dysfunctional and unproductive

Rather than build a healthy, peaceful and cooperative relationship with these other nations; this fear-based weapon-threatening policy merely perpetuates a dysfunctional adversarial relationship. Instead of building a cooperative collaborative relationship between nations, based on our shared goals of economic prosperity and climate stability; this weapon-insane policy merely sustains a competition for weapons to kill one another and destroy the world, which has no value in itself.

To assume the worst of other nations, rather than cooperating and making friends, is just a never-ending pattern of a dysfunctional relation; which cannot deeply change, unless there is a change in attitude and in how the other is approached. The best diplomatic approach and foreign policy is to first attempt to understand the other's motives and intentions, then find ways to mutually benefit one another, while also having an attitude of mutual cooperation and friendship.

A Confused Mixup between
defensive and offensive intentions

Even if it were true that Russia and China were developing more advanced weapon systems, these advanced weapon and delivery systems are most likely intended to be defensive or intended as their own deterrent to possible attack.

Their advancements of weapon systems should be understood as an advancement of their national defense and deterrence against an attack by the U.S., rather than interpreted as an advancement of their capacity to launch an offensive attack.

As is the case with most deterrence thinking, there is often a confusion between an offensive threat and a deterrence threat.

It is extremely unlikely, or even absurd, that Russia or China would consider attacking us with nuclear weapons or any kind of super advanced weapon.

The first reason that this is phantom fear is that this would be suicidal for them. And the second reason is that there would be no favorable achievement in doing so; or in other words, why would they attack us?

Would they want to try and conquer the American people, to force Americans into being Russian-controlled? Yeah right. Would they be that stupid?

'Weapons for Deterrence'
but are these defensive or offensive?

Deterrence confuses and equivocates defense with offense, which creates a problematic implication.

The aim of having an effective Nuclear Deterrence is to deter other NW nations from attacking us with their nuclear weapons. Thus, this deterrence is intended to be a means for defending the nation.

Yet, this system of Nuclear Deterrence is actually composed of offensive weapons – for attacking other NW nations, even though these attack weapons are categorized as retaliatory (defensive) weapons.

However, these 'retaliatory weapons' (which we call 'defensive') are then viewed by other NW nations as 'offensive threats' – which are then cause for those other nations to build up their own offensive threatening weaponry, in order increase their own power of deterrence.

This then creates a circular cause-effect problem. It creates a self-escalating system, in which NW nations keep improving their capabilities for nuclear weapon attacks (though these offensive weapons are viewed as retaliatory weapons), which then makes them more threatening and thus creates more of a need for other nations to improve and build their offensive (retaliatory) weapons.

A simple analogy is this. Imagine two warriors face to face, holding knives. Then, one warrior finds a gun, so the other one has to find a gun. Next, one warrior gets a hand grenade, so the other warrior also gets one. Next, one warrior gets a nuclear weapon, so the other warrior also gets one. Then one warrior builds better nuclear weapons, and so the other warrior builds better ones as well, and so on, as this situation gets ever worse and even sort of ridiculous (though the dangers become ever increasingly tragic). Also, there can be no winners in this combat, for each will probably suffer about the same.

An Alternative Defense Strategy:
Focus on Defensive Technologies

The Deterrence Rationale for developing evermore advanced weapons for the 'threat of retaliatory attack' is also questionable, when we consider an alternative defense strategy of primarily strengthening our defensive capabilities.

Our current Deterrence Strategy for national defense is centered on a reasoning that no other NW nation would dare to launch a nuclear attack on our nation because, if they did, we have the capability to launch a strong and credible retaliatory attack on their nation – which will probably destroy as much (or more) of them as they destroy of us. This Strategy is based on posing a substantial Threat of Retaliation, which nations can rationally perceive as having an end result of 'mutual destruction' or 'mutual suicide', and therefore no NW nation would rationally attack any other.

As we can see, this Strategy is based on having capable and effective Weapons of Attack, in order to create enough of a Destructive Retaliatory Threat. These 'attack-weapons' have to be sufficiently effective at penetrating through defenses and also effective in being massively destructive as a retaliation.

This kind of Strategy has many fallacies, uncertain assumptions, and problematic implications, as have already been presented.

So now, let us pose the questions:

Why focus on and spend so much money
on Weapons for Retaliatory Attack?

Why focus so much on having
a Threat of Destructive Retaliation?

Instead, an alternative, would be to focus primarily on defensive technologies, along with bold multilateral reductions of nuclear attack weaponry.

Focusing primarily on Credible Defensive Technologies, and primarily spending our public money on Credible Defense (rather than Retaliatory Attack Weapons), would be a less dangerous, and less costly Strategy of National Defense, and it would be just as effective in preventing a nuclear attack. For if we have the capability of destroying nuclear bombs before they reach our national airspace and land, then other NW nations would rationally conclude that any attempted nuclear attack would be useless, and it would consequently provoke an international response of absolute economic sanctions and the eventual ruin that nation's economy. That is, if other NW nations rationally understand that any nuclear attack would, most likely, be ineffective and useless, then this is enough reason for never attempting it.

Focus on International Diplomacy

See...
→ Better Alternatives for Defense