Does History support Deterrence?
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Fallacies of Deterrence
A pro-Deterrence argument:
History
shows that Deterrence works
One of the pro-Deterrence arguments is an attempt to use historical evidence to show 'the effectiveness of Deterrence' in preventing nuclear attacks and wars, as well as ensuring national and global security. In this argument, the history of Nuclear Deterrence is used as evidence that it is successful. The argument might go like this:
Look how well Deterrence has worked!
Ever since there's been nuclear deterrence,
there's never been a nuclear attack
The reasoning in this pro-deterrence argument is that ever since nations have had nuclear weapons for Deterrence, there has never been a nuclear attack on any nation, and our own national security and safety has been preserved.
And to extend this line of reasoning into more specific terms, it could be said that
ever since nations have increased their nuclear arsenals
and improved their launch capabilities, there has never been a
nuclear war nor any launching of a nuclear weapon. This history is, therefore, a
good reason to support a continued policy of nuclear deterrence and a continuing increase of sophisticated advanced weapons.
Counter-argument
History shows that Deterrence works
is a post hoc fallacy
Pro-deterrence advocates are attempting to convince us that the historical fact of nuclear weapons never being used since WWII is either conclusive or supportive evidence that nuclear deterrence has been successful.
But this is a fallacy of
'assumed causation'
(a post-hoc fallacy).
Historical facts cannot be used as rational evidence to make a conclusion that Nuclear Deterrence is effective or successful.
This is because it is a fallacy to simply assume that nuclear deterrence (along with its gradual increase in advanced nuclear weapons), was the primary or necessary cause of a post-WWII world without any nuclear attacks or wars. This fallacy of thinking can even include the assumption that a nuclear attack would probably have occurred by now, if we did not have a strong nuclear deterrence (with a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons and ever-advancing systems for delivering a retaliatory nuclear attack).
It is a fact that no nuclear bomb has been launched or dropped, since nations possessed nuclear deterrence. But this fact is insufficient evidence to conclude that nations having nuclear deterrence is the cause of there never having been a nuclear bomb dropped since WWII. Nor can this fact be regarded as evidence that the prevention of nuclear attacks depends on nuclear deterrence. Nor is this sufficient evidence that 'without nuclear deterrence' there 'would be' or 'would have been' a nuclear attack somewhere in the world.
The historical fact – that nuclear weapons have never been used since nations possessed nuclear deterrence – is not a sufficient or supporting reason to believe that this fact resulted from nations possessing nuclear deterrence.
In other words, it is a fact [fact-B] that there has never been a nuclear attack since WWII, and it is a fact [fact-A] that during this time NW nations had a nuclear deterrence. But we cannot, with any certainty or proof, conclude that fact-A caused fact-B, or that fact-A was necessary to achieve fact-B, or that fact-B depended on fact-A, or that without fact-A there would be no occurance of fact-B.
It can be granted that nuclear deterrence may have been a causal or contributing factor in preventing nuclear launches; but the historical fact itself [of no nuclear launches] is not conclusive evidence that the prevention of a nuclear launch resulted from 'nuclear deterrence'.
Thus, it would be a 'fallacy of assumed causation' to simply conclude that no nation has ever attacked another nation with nuclear weapons because of those nations having nuclear deterrence. And thus it would be a fallacy to assume that past history gives any certainty to a conclusion that national and international security is ensured by nations having nuclear weapons, or ensured by a nuclear deterrence security strategy.
Historical facts cannot
ensure
nor predict the future
The historical fact that 'no nuclear bombs have been launched since WWII' gives some support to the nuclear deterrence policy; but past history cannot give any certainty that nuclear deterrence will always be effective. Nor does this fact prove a pro-deterrence argument that nuclear deterrence was ever 'necessary' in preventing nations from launching a nuclear attack. And neither does this past history support a conclusion that nuclear deterrence is 'the best and safest' way to ensure national and global security.
It's a fallacy to assume that past circumstances will continue into the future. Just because no nuclear bomb has been launched or dropped since nations have had nuclear weapons, doesn't ensure with any certainty that this fact will continue into the near future.
Circumstances may change, national priorities may change, fears and threats may escalate, and even accidents may happen, which may then result in some kind of nuclear attack.
Making decisions based on the apparent past success of nuclear deterrence is unreliable and devoid of rational soundness. We have to study the circumstances as they are now and make decisions based on present facts, rather than on past facts and sketchy conclusions.
There are other possible reasons why nuclear weapons have never been used
The main reason why there has never been a nuclear weapon used after WWII is probably because any use of a nuclear weapon would be horrendously destructive for innocent people and the global environment.
Nations are rational and economic enough to know that – launching a nuclear weapon on another nation is pure madness, for it would destroy valuable resources and ecologies of land, air, and water, along with innocent populations. One could even argue that these are the more significant reasons that nations have not launched nuclear weapons on one another; the significant reason for no nuclear launches so far is not the fact of nuclear weapons pointed at other nations and populations.
Moreover, it is just as reasonable to believe that nuclear attacks and war could have been 'more safely' avoided all these years by way of international negotiations and agreements towards a Gradual Reduction and a Final Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.
What is a post hoc fallacy?
A post hoc fallacy can also be called a 'fallacy of assumed causation'.
It is to assume that a certain event,
or situation, is 'the
cause' of certain proceeding events or situations.
In other words, it is a post hoc fallacy to assume that a certain situation in the world was 'caused by' a particular event or situation that preceded it.
This assumption is a fallacy;
because
it could be true, or could not be true.
In this fallacy, one might believe or argue that 'something
presently happening'
(or something that is presently a fact)
is
the result of a 'particular occurrence
that happened before
it'.
The reason this kind of belief is a fallacy
is that –
just because a certain event [A] precedes another event [B], it is
insufficient to conclude that [A] caused [B].
The fallacy assumes that [B] would not have occurred without the occurrence of [A]. But in truth, [B] could have occurred without [A]. Sound reasoning shows that [A] could be a cause of [B], but maybe not.
A 'sequential correlation' of [A] and [B]
is insufficient to
conclude that [A] 'caused' [B]. Therefore, a belief is unreliable and uncertain, if it is based
on a post hoc assumption about what caused [B].
A Counter-argument:
History
shows that Deterrence is ineffective for Global Peace & Security
If pro-Deterrent advovates argue that post-WWII history provides evidence that nuclear deterrence is effective in preventing nuclear attack and war; then critics of Deterrence can counter-argue that post-WWII history also provides evidence that a policy of nuclear deterrence does not prevent terrible wars of death and destruction with the use of modern conventional weapons. So if the ultimate goal of national and global security is peace and security from the tradegies of war, then the policies of nuclear deterrence have failed to achieve this larger goal.
For as can be seen from post-WWII history, nuclear weapons and the policy of nuclear deterrence do not achieve or enhance overall peace and security in the world. Instead, wars continue to be fought, thousands are killed, environments are ruined, and a tremendous amount of money is wasted on buying weapons and financing these military conflicts. For example, while possessing nuclear deterrence weapons the U.S. has fought wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq, and nuclear weapons did not deter, prevent, nor resolve these conflicts.
Moreover, countries having numerous nuclear weapons,
ready-to-deploy at any moment, and the possibility ever-looming
that they might be deployed intentionally or accidentally, is
not much of an assurance of world peace and safety. Rather, it creates a constant looming threat of populations and necessary ecosystems being destroyed. This continual looming threat of nuclear weapons being used, either for surprise attack or for retaliation, does not help any person or nation feel more safe and secure.
So if one of the pro-deterrence arguments is
'History
shows that deterrence works'
then what is meant by 'deterrence works'?
Precisely 'what is' working?
Not much – except for the 'achievement'
of nuclear weapons preventing the use of nuclear weapons.
Yet these nuclear weapons would not be needed at all, if those weapons were eliminated. All that is really 'working' is a self-perpetuating 'need' for nuclear weapons – to deter nuclear weapons. It's all just a circular and self-perpetuating system.
And to sustain all of these weapons of deterrence involves a Huge Cost, as well as a Huge Danger to the whole world by having these mass-destructive weapons ever-ready to launch all over the world and ignite a global nuclear war.
So, all of the NW nations have nuclear weapons for deterrence – in order to deter each other from launching their deterrence weapons.
Does that make much sense?
A need for Deterrence Weapons
to deter Deterrence Weapons?
Is the main goal of national and global security merely to succeed in deterring
other nuclear deterring nations?
Each NW nation is justifying its nuclear weapons as being a needed deterrent against the other nations with nuclear weapons for the goal of deterrence. In other words, each is enhancing, developing, and always ready on alert to launch nuclear This is an interesting case of abject stupidy, circular reasoning, and dsyfunctional policy. This whole deterrence-thinking and how it works is ridiculous, and it doesn't even bring peace and security in the world. All that it effectively is – is a danger and an additional fear in the world, which upsets security, trust, and peace.
The greater Goal of an effective national security has to be Global Peace
and Security. Yet, overall National Security cannot be achieved by having hundreds
of nuclear warheads pointed at other NW nations.
The best assurance of national security is to achieve peace with other nations, and the best way to achieve this is not by threatening other nations with mutual mass-destruction, but rather by establishing cooperative and collaborative international relations.
A true and effective security among nations cannot be achieved by maintaining a nuclear-threatening relationship.
The Circular Reasoning
Since the practical effectiveness of Nuclear Deterrence is only
applicable in relation to other nuclear weaponized nations, then
the fundamental reason for nations having nuclear weapons is for
defense against other nuclear weaponized nations.
But this reasoning is circular and self-perpetuating, because
nuclear weaponized nations end up being in their own exclusive
club, in which each nation has nuclear weapons for the sole
purpose of defending against other nations with nuclear weapons.
In other words, by joining this exclusive club and having
nuclear weapons, that nation is suddenly a nuclear threat to the
other nuclear nations and therefore a nuclear target. Thus, by
being in this nuclear-weapon club, that nation is now a target
for being bombed by nuclear weapons, and because it is now a
target, it needs a deterrence of nuclear weapons for its national
defense.
This is, of course, circular reasoning because, by having an
arsenal of nuclear weapons, that nation now requires those weapons
for deterrence.
Whereas, if a nation does not join this special club, or
if there were no such club, then there would be no 'need' for
nuclear weapons to deter nuclear weapons.
The Policy of Nuclear Deterrence
The circular and self-perpetuating security paradigm of Nuclear Deterrence is creating a Global Race for developing new Hi-Tech Advanced Weapons and Delivery Systems.
Instead of plans for a Reduction of nuclear weapons, NW nations have plans for New and Improved Weapons! A recent
study by the Federation of American Scientists shows that nuclear-armed
states have plans for developing and deploying new and improved
nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, nine states – the US, Russia, China, Israel, the
UK, France, India, Pakistan and North Korea – together
possess about 13,400 weapons. And it estimated that the US and Russia have a total of about 1,800 warheads on High Alert – 'ready for use on short notice'. Furthermore, 'retired' warheads and bombs are being replaced by
more powerful, versatile devices, including smaller, “use-able” nukes for conventional battlefields.
In addition, Hi-tech advanced nuclear weapons
are being developed in parallel with a 'race
for space'; as the major NW nations now have plans to expand their Space Weapon
capabilities.
Where are we
going with this?
Space
warfare
would go against the International Outer Space Treaty
Agreement, which bans weapons of mass destruction in space orbit,
yet these ideas are nonetheless being discussed by military
leaders in the large NW nations. And with so many satellites being
launched into space, how hard would it be to outfit some of these
with weapons ready to fire at ground targets or at other
satellites?
See...
Read... It's estimated that Russia and the United States keep a staggering 1,800 strategic nuclear warheads on high alert on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles, ready to launch between 5 and 15 minutes after receiving a launch order. These forces number more nuclear warheads than all the other seven nuclear weapons states in the world have, combined.
The practice of keeping nuclear weapons on alert evolved during the Cold War, as the United States and the Soviet Union deployed fully-armed nuclear weapons that could strike the adversary before it could retaliate. Nuclear crises, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, resulted in significantly increased alert levels but also deepened global concerns that such nuclear combat readiness could lead to accidents and misunderstandings with catastrophic consequences.
At the end of the Cold War, the United States, the Soviet Union, and later Russia removed several categories of nuclear weapons from alert, including long-range bombers and non-strategic nuclear forces. Since then, Republican and Democratic US presidential candidates have recommended changing the US and Russian alert postures, but little has happened.
Former US President George W. Bush stated in 2000 that, “high-alert, hair-trigger” nuclear forces were leftovers from the Cold War, inappropriate and dangerous in today’s world, and that he would reduce the alert levels. President Barack Obama echoed that concern in 2007, saying on the campaign trail that he would work with Russia to take nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert, and criticized Bush for not fulfilling his promise. Next, the Obama also continued the current 'Alert Posture'.
Russia has shown no interest in reducing nuclear alert, but instead has worked to increase the readiness level of its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. France and Britain also deploy 80 and 48 fully operational nuclear weapons, respectively, but on their missile submarines, at a lower readiness level than Russian and US forces. Other nuclear weapon states do not see a need to keep nuclear forces on alert, despite their much smaller arsenals.
Opponents of 'de-alerting' argue the necessity of keeping nuclear weapons at a high level of combat readiness in order to protect them against surprise attack and to provide the national leadership with more time and options during a crisis, including striking the adversary’s nuclear forces first to limit the reciprocal damage it could inflict. Opponents contend that robust safety measures are in place that prevent unauthorized, mistaken, or accidental use, also stating that de-alerting would be complicated and expensive to verify. Their most frequent argument, however, is that de-alerting nuclear weapons would be more dangerous because it could create a re-alerting race that would reduce crisis stability by giving an adversary the incentive to attack before re-alerting were complete.
Supporters for 'de-alerting' argue that nuclear alert is inappropriate in a world that is trying to reduce the numbers and role of nuclear weapons. They state that the potential consequences of accidents or misunderstandings outweigh the limited and theoretical benefits created by combat-ready nuclear forces. They also maintain that warnings about a “re-alerting race” are overblown because today’s highly alerted nuclear postures involve visibly deploying, or “generating,” nuclear forces and increasing alert levels in a crisis. It is possible, supporters argue, to reduce alert nuclear forces in a gradual, careful, and verifiable manner that diminishes risks for all. Moreover, supporters of de-alerting measures warn that it is particularly important to reduce nuclear alerts now to discourage smaller nuclear weapon states from also increasing the readiness of their nuclear forces—a concern that would be even more relevant if China and India were to equip their ballistic missiles with multiple warheads.
Even if one believes that some nuclear alert is necessary, the number of weapons that Russia and the United States keep on alert seems far too large at a time when much else from the Cold War has faded, and Russian-US goods trade reached nearly $43 billion in 2011. The high level of nuclear alert locks the countries’ nuclear planning into unnecessarily excessive and expensive threat postures that are out of sync with the political and military realities of today’s world.
The two nations could begin tackling this dilemma, if not by completely de-alerting all of their nuclear forces in one act, then through a phased approach in which they gradually remove parts of their postures from alert, reduce readiness levels, lengthen decision times, and develop the experience and means to verify the process.
The United States has many more ICBMs than Russia, and Russia has more missiles equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), so a first step could involve taking a portion of the US ICBMs off alert and one of the most MIRVed Russian ICBMs—SS-18 or SS-19—off alert. Subsequent steps would be to remove gradually more of the remaining forces from alert.
is to 'deter' the deterrence nuclear weapons of other nations.
Does that create global peace and security?
for being a NW nation
is creating a New Global Arms Race
A
Taxonomy of Space Weapons
Does NATO need Nuclear Deterrence?
The underlying concern in this situation is that Russia would launch a nuclear attack on Europe, if the US and NATO did not have a sufficiently credible nuclear retaliatory deterrence. But would Russia have any nationalistic reason to attack Europe with nuclear weapons?
No longer does Russia (previously USSR) have a communist
ideological reason for attacking Europe. Russia's present goals
are economic prosperity and political stability. So, the only
reason for Russia to attack Europe would be for some economic
gain,
or an acquisition of resources or labor.
But if Russia wanted to acquire European resources or land, it
would be counter-productive for them to destroy European land and
resources with nuclear weapons.
As well, it would be
counter-productive for Russia to seek such a ridiculous objective
as defeating Europe and attempting to enslave the European people
into working for the economic aims of the Russian government.
Would any sane person really believe that was possible? Of course
not.
Second, even if defense policy-makers believe that some sort of nuclear deterrence is needed, the U.S. already has hundreds of nuclear weapons ready to instantly launch at Russia, which are not in Europe – yet nonetheless are very capable of severly destroying Russian facilities and populations, in retaliation for any nuclear attack on Europe. So, there really is no need to have any deterrence weapons in Europe.
Third, political and economic diplomacy is a better policy to achieve peace and security, and certainly less expensive; because if Russia enjoys economically mutual trade benefits with Europe, then there would be no reason to attack or destroy European resources.
Fourth, if all sides agreed to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, then there is no more need for nuclear deterrence.
Even if Russia,
China, and NATO agreed
to at least significantly reduce
their nuclear weapons, then this would significantly reduce
tensions, dangers, and mistrust among those parties. Therefore, there needs to be an earnest effort and willingness for these parties to meet and justly negotiate
a huge reduction in their nuclear weapon capacities and their plans for improvements.
An Argument for Limited Deterrence:
At Least Reduce these Nuclear Weapons
and the Race for Advanced Weapons
At Least, the major NW nations should convene together in earnest negotiation towards agreeing on a courageous and bold Nuclear Disarmament. Like for example, how many nuclear missiles does a nation need in order to achieve deterrence? Surely no more than 12. Why all the thousands, as we have now? Having thousands or even hundreds of Nuclear Deterrence Weapons is so dumb that is an insult on God's Intelligence. It is reason at its lowest form.
The NW nations need to sit down right now and get this under control, and boldly reduce to Nuclear Weapons to just a needed few, just in order to have some degree of nuclear deterrence – but not overdoing it. Next, NW nations need to develop more trust, accomplished with more global cooperation, collaboration, and fair trade. These actions will bring global peace and security.
The Need for Multilateral Negotiations
NW nations need to begin Disarmament Negotiations and cooperatively work out a Bold Practical Plan to expediantly reduce and gradually eliminate all nuclear weapons throughout the world, and this phased plan can include effective verification with international observation.
This Disarmanent Plan could even be done with oversight from the United Nations. Each year the UN General Assembly calls for a Nuclear Weapons Convention for negotiating a Global Nuclear Weapon Treaty that would prohibit the threat or use of nuclear weapons and establish a phased program for their complete elimination, under effective international supervision. Yet, this Convention is never implemented, because it is not supported by the major nuclear-armed countries (France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States) and countries under extended nuclear deterrence relationships (NATO members, Australia, Japan and South Korea).
See...
The proposed Nuclear Weapons Convention
See...
Better Alternatives
for Global Security
The Current Delusion
of Cold War Thinking
The New Security Threat
is Cyber Warfare
also see... this Critique of Deterrence
➔
The Myth & Ineffectiveness
of Nuclear Deterrence
for eliminating
Nuclear Weapons
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