Do Nuclear Weapons keep us Safe?
or Less-Safe?

Having a huge arsenal of mass-destructive nuclear weapons and advanced missiles to deliver them is promoted [by pro-deterrence advisors] to 'ensure' our national security and keep us all Safe.

But this whole nuclear deterrence system, with its advanced capabilities to massively wipe out cities, people and environments, actually makes our nation and the world
Less Safe and More Dangerous!

Having these super mass-destructive nuclear weapons pointed all over the world is an extremely dangerous way to supposedly "make the world safe".

We can agree that 'mutual nuclear destruction' is a logical deterrence from nuclear attack, in that other nations will know that any nuclear attack will result in a very destructive retaliation against them, and therefore there is more harm than benefit in launching a nuclear attack.

However, national and international security, or the safety of all nations, would be better assured by nations having less nuclear weapons or, even better, none at all.

A world without any nuclear weapons,
or with far fewer weapons,
would surely be Safer World.

It is completely irrational to think that a world with nuclear weapons, and a huge amount of them, is safer and more secure than a world without nuclear weapons.

How can anyone rationally think that nations are “safe” or “secure” when nations are pointing their nuclear weapons at cities and regions all over the world, ever-ready to launch with their leader's decision, and ever-ready to destroy people and environments? How can anyone feel safe or secure in such a dangerous world – with everpresent threats of nuclear destruction?

Are Nuclear Weapons really necessary?

If a nation's Objective is to be safe and secure from harm by other nations, then are nuclear weapons necessary to achieve this?

It would be very difficult for pro-deterrence supporters to tenably argue that a nuclear-deterrence structure is necessary for national security and safety, rather than having a less-costly and less-dangerous structure for national and international security.

Therefore, even if this nuclear-deterrent defense policy has been working so far, and with no nation yet launching a nuclear attack, there could still be alternative deterrences that do not involve threats of nuclear destruction and vast harm to innocent people.

Also note that for the U.S., if all nations were to surrender all nuclear weapons, the U.S. Military Force would still be the most powerful (and thus the most deterring force) in the world.

The Catastrophic Global Consequences from multiple Nuclear Retaliations

The nuclear deterrence strategy is based on a threat to other NW nations that, If we are attacked with nuclear weapons, then we will retaliate with our own nuclear weapons.

However, if this did ever occur, then most likely the result would be attack, retaliation, counter-retaliation, counter-retaliation, counter-retaliation, and so it goes, until one of the nations is fully exhausted and defeated. But the overall humanitarian and environmental result, from this repeating and escalating retaliation, is utterly disastrous! Just imagine the global destruction from all these weapons!

As can be observed in the history of many armed conflicts, 'retaliation' can become an endless cycle, because each side thinks the other side has inflicted an unjust or disproportionate retaliation. So each side has to at least get even – which the other side thinks is disproportionate, and thus they must retaliate even more.

Thus, the Policy of Deterrence opens the possibility of numerous retaliatory counter-attacks from each country, even if just one nuclear weapon were initially launched (either intentionally or accidentally). So, instead of 'mutually assured defense', the Deterrence Policy can easily result in 'mutually assured destruction' of cities, people, and even the global ecosystem.

Therefore, it should be remembered that if there ever is a retaliation, as is promised in the deterrence strategy, then most likely this end up being retaliation upon retaliation upon retaliation. In other words, there will be many many nuclear explosions and harms upon people and the global ecosystem, and not just one or two.

Ultimately, a Nuclear Deterrence Policy
is tempting a massive global disaster

see articles...

➔ Land-based ICBMs
      are unnecessary & dangerous

➔ Developing 'usable' Warheads
      is provoking & dangerous

Nuclear Deterrence creates
More Danger in the world

Security Policies of Nuclear Deterrence,
with their Threat of Assured Retaliation,
Add More Global Danger & Insecurity
for everyone in the world.

Nuclear Deterrence is based on a threat to all other NW nations that any nuclear attack will result in a retaliatory launch of nuclear weapons on that attacking nation, thus resulting in deaths and destruction upon the attacker. In other words, a nation with nuclear deterrence is communicating to all NW nations that any attacking nation will suffer from nuclear weapons as much as the nation attacked. Thus, deterrence is a threat of 'mutual destruction' due to an equalizing retaliation.

Now of course, the Objective of nuclear deterrence, its Hope, is that no nuclear weapons will ever be launched in the first place, and neither will any retaliatory nuclear weapons ever need to be launched.

But if nations did not have any nuclear weapons, then there would be no “need” for having any nuclear weapons as a deterrence, and also there would be no possible horrible outcomes of nuclear destruction upon people and their environment.

So, why don't all NW nations agree to multilaterally eliminate their nuclear weapons, in order to completely avoid the possibility of mass-destruction by nuclear weapons?

Nations having any nuclear weapons is, in itself, a grave danger to people everywhere and a grave danger to the global ecosystems supporting our very life on Earth. Then, to add even further grave danger to all of us, the maintaining of 'nuclear deterrence' and its threat of 'nuclear retaliation' adds in even more possibility of massive deaths and destruction. So the unfortunate fact of any nation possessing nuclear weapons, along with the possibility of using those weapons, is itself a terrible looming danger to humanity.

But then, this danger of nuclear destruction is multiplied even further by the policy of nuclear deterrence. That is, the threats inherent in nuclear deterrence actually adds More Danger, to all people in the world. It adds more possibilities of humanitarian and ecological destruction, because with the 'deterrence threat' there would be much more human and global destruction, than if one nation happened to launch nuclear weapons upon another nation.

Thus, all policies of nuclear deterrence actually add more danger to everyone in the world – rather than make the world safer from nuclear mass destruction.

There is no certainty
in nuclear deterrence

The use of nuclear weapons is not absolutely deterred by nations having large arsenals of nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems.

Whereas, nations not having nuclear weapons is the only certainty for nuclear weapons never being used. In other words, the best 'deterrence' against the use of nuclear weapons is for nations to not have them.

We cannot simply assume that a consequence of 'mutual destruction', or 'retaliatory harm' to potential attacking nations, will always deter those nations from launching a nuclear attack.

Is there any real certainty in this assumption? Not at all.

For example, a nation might perceive that the rewards of a nuclear attack on another nation will outweigh the unfortunate loss of some of their own citizens and cities. This might not seem rational to some people, but history shows that governments (or militaries) have often under-valued and risked the safety of their own citizens, or even allowed their sacrifice, in order to advance a certain agenda for the benefit of that nation's ruling elite, or in order to increase the overall wealth of a nation, or in order to gain a military or economic advantage over the nation being attacked.

Furthermore, the destruction of cities and civilians, upon either of the nations at war, has not always been militarily decisive, because militaries already expect some degree of 'collateral damage' in a war, such as incidental or unintended deaths. People, cities, land and environment are often weighed against the intended benefits of a military or larger economic agenda.

Therefore, it is conceivable that another NW nation could decide to launch a nuclear attack on the US or some other adversary, in spite of the retaliatory consequences, thinking that the damages done to the attacked-nation outweigh the damages done to one's own nation.

This possibility and uncertainty is always prevailing, as long as nations have nuclear weapons as a 'deterrence'.

The Danger of an Accidental Launch

An Accidental Launch of Nuclear Weapons
is much more probable than an 'intentional nuclear attack' by another nation

An accidental nuclear launch,
or an accidental retaliatory response,
is more dangerously probable
than being attacked by another nation.

Any reasonable analysis of national security would easily show that there is no sane or practical reason for another NW nation to intentionally launch a nuclear attack on the U.S. or on a European ally. What would be gained by this? Nothing useful, and this is why no NW nation has made a nuclear attack on a non-weaponized nation since the end of WWII. Simply put, there is no point or reason to do so.

Pro-deterrence arguments might claim that this fact is due to the strength of nuclear deterrence, but that is not the true reason. For even if there were no deterrence systems in place, attacking another nation with nuclear weapons is pointless in our modern economically motivated world, and any nuclear destruction would simply hurt the global economic system, as well as create further harm to the global ecosystem and climate change.

In other words, an intentional nuclear attack on any nation, even without any nuclear deterrence in the world, is ridiculously improbable and without any rationale.

But, an accidental launching of a nuclear weapon, either as an accidental first-strike or as an accidental retaliation, is very probable, especially since many NW nations use computer-automative response systems.
And in this modern age of internet hacking and cyber attacks, an accidental computer-generated nuclear launch is even more possible.

The Danger of Nuclear Terrorism

In addition to the dangerous risk of an accidental launch of nuclear weapons is the disturbing risk of a terrorist group stealing and detonating a nuclear weapon, or triggering an accidental nuclear launch by breaching computer cyber-security.

A terrorist or violent extremist group could obtain a nuclear bomb and explode it in a city, or an internet hacker could fool a nuclear defense system into a false retaliatory response, in order to set forth a nuclear war and nuclear catastrophe.

And our huge and extremely expensive military and nuclear deterrence system is not geared to deter against these new and real security threats – because having hundreds or thousands of 'retaliatory nuclear weapons' is Not a deterrent against these scattered and decentralized terrorist groups.

The Risky Dangers
of increasingly Advanced Weapons

Maintaining a robust Deterrence
could provoke a first-strike attack

Maintaining a robust Deterrence, with superior capabilities, could motivate a first-strike from a nuclear adversary.

If a NW nation believes that an adversary's nuclear weapon systems are far superior to their own and could overwhelmingly defeat their current defense, then that weaker nation might fearfully react with a surprise first attack on the stronger nation, rather than wait and worry about being defeated by the stronger nation.

In other words, if a nation thinks that an adversarial NW nation has a far superior weapon capability, even if they say it is only for defense, then the weaker nation might launch a surprise first-strike attack before that stronger nation has a chance to launch their superior weapons.

Thus, by developing super advanced and superior weapons, that nation could end up provoking a first-strike by an adversary who thinks their defense is now in jeopardy if that superior-weapon nation were to attack with their overwhelming weapons.

See the Page -

The Endless Problem
of Weapon Advancements